# [ASCIS2020 Finals] RWE writeups

All files can be found here.

# RWE (RE)

• Given files: rwe, description.
• The rwe file is an ELF 32-bit executable statically compiled and stripped. It asks for an input command when being executed.
• The description file says: “Please try to read flag.txt file”.

## Analysis

### Step 1: Analyze main function (IDA Pro)

The binary is stripped, so IDA can’t identify the main function, but because this is an ELF file, I could identify where main is by inspecting the start function, it is sub_804CD40.

Initially, IDA cannot decompile main because it fails to analyze the indirect call at address 0x0804CE9F. By checking the Stack pointer box in IDA’s Option -> General to show the stack pointer analysis at each instruction, I saw that the call instruction subtracts the sp value by a lot, which is not normal and is also the reason why IDA can’t analyze it. Thanks to @lanleft’s suggestion, I modified that value (by pressing alt + k) to a reasonable one and then IDA can decompile it cleanly.

All of the libc functions are also stripped, which makes reverse engineering a lot harder. Normally, we can use the following trick to “unstrip” the binary: statically compile a dummy binary and use a binary diffing tool (BinDiff or diaphora) to compare the two binaries and identify the similar functions. However, most of the functions in this binary is not that hard to recognize based on its parameters if you are familiar with ELFs, so I just assumed them all this way.

The program first prints out a banner and a prompt, then read in 512 bytes of input. The complex block of code after reading input is actually just buf[strlen(buf)-1] = '\0', I recognized this by debugging and googling some weird constants. Next is a call to sub_804D930, which is a base64 decoding routine on our input (this can be assumed easily without digging into it by using IDA plugin findcrypt). After that comes the important part: the program initializes a struct, assigns one of its field to be a function-pointer table, allocates and assigns two big memory spaces and copy our decoded input into one of it (in sub_804E390 and sub_804E2B0). This immediately gave me an idea that this is a virtual machine, the two memory spaces are the code and the stack, but those were just assumptions that would later be verified when I dug deeper into it.

### Step 2: Analyze VM execution (IDA Pro + gdb)

The VM’s execution function is the second function in the function table, which gets called right after initialization. The function is supringly simple with only 3 cases of opcodes: DE, DF and DD. Analyzing these small cases gave me the following information:

• The 2 fields I mentioned earlier are indeed the code and the stack, they are managed by a program counter and a stack pointer.
• There are also 6 other registers, I named them reg0 to reg5.
• DE and DF are 2-byte instructions, which are pop regX and push regX, X must be less than or equal to 5.
• DD is a 5-byte instruction, which is push imm32, imm32 must be less than or equal to 0x1000, we will see later that actually all imm32 in this VM must satisfy that condition.

After that comes the weird part that answers why the code is so simple: if the opcode is not any of those, the VM will subtract it by 0x10 and use it as an index to an offset table to retrieve an offset from 0x820A000, then jump to that location. By using a simple python script, I could identify the destination of each corresponding opcodes:

OFFSETS = [4293147974, 4293149121, 4293149088, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293149037, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293148998, 4293148934, 4293148871, 4293148827, 4293148768, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293148718, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293148608, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293148514, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293148441, 4293148330, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293148222, 4293148110, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293148079, 4293148040, 4293147999, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147991, 4293147923]
all_insts = {}

for i in range(len(OFFSETS)):
all_insts[i] = 0x820A000 + OFFSETS[i] - 0x100000000

temp = {val : key for key, val in all_insts.items()}
insts = {val : key for key, val in temp.items()}
for key, val in insts.items():
print("{} : {}".format(hex(key + 0x10), hex(val)))


But because of this specific handler of opcodes, IDA can’t know in advance what is the destination of each opcodes, therefore it can’t decompile them. I got stuck here for a while trying to read and understand the asm code, but it was kinda hopeless, so I came up with an idea: patching the jump of one of the push/pop instructions so that it jumps into the opcode I wanted to decompile, by this way I could analyze the opcodes one by one, here are their functionalities (actually only 2 additional opcodes are required for the solution, but I decided to reverse them all anyway to practice a bit, the opcodes marked with ? are the ones that I am unsure about):

DE: pop regX (2 bytes)
DF: push regX (2 bytes)
DD: push imm32 (5 bytes)
11: jeq imm32 (? - 5 bytes)
12: jne imm32 (? - 5 bytes)
19: mov regX, code_base + imm32 (6 bytes)
1f: jmp regX (2 bytes)
20: mov regY, regX (2 bytes, Y and X in 1 byte)
21: mov regX, [code + imm32] (6 bytes)
22: mov regX, [code + imm32] (same as 21? - 6 bytes)
23: mov [code + imm32], regX (6 bytes)
30: add regX, imm32 (6 bytes)
35: add reg0, regX (2 bytes)
40: xor regY, regX (2 bytes, Y and X in 1 byte)
50: sub regX, imm32 (6 bytes)
51: sub reg0, regX (2 bytes)
60: geq regY, regX (2 bytes, Y and X in 1 byte)
61: leq regY, regX (2 bytes, Y and X in 1 byte)
80: syscall reg0(reg1, reg2, reg3) (1 byte)
81: call memcpy (?)
82: call something (?)
90: exit


### Step 3: Writing the code to read flag.txt (pwntools)

So then based on what description says, my goal is to read the flag.txt file. Being a pwnable player, because we have an opcode to make a syscall, I knew that we can achieve this by writing a piece of VM code to call execve("/bin/sh", NULL, NULL) or writing an open-read-write chain. But since I didn’t know the absolute path to the flag file, I went with the execve way (which is also simpler).

The code is actually extremely simple: I put execve syscall number (0x0b) into reg0, 0x00 into reg2 and reg3 by using pushes and pops. The /bin/sh\0 string for reg1 can be inserted at the end of our input code, and then I used opcode 19 to put its address into reg1. Finally, a syscall instruction is called to open the shell.

from pwn import *
from base64 import b64encode

r = process("./rwe")

code = b"\xDD" + p32(0x0b) # push 0x0b - execve
code += b"\xDE\x00" # pop reg0
code += b"\x19\x01" + p32(0x1c) # mov reg1, code_base + 0x1c
code += b"\xDD" + p32(0x00) # push 0x00
code += b"\xDE\x02" # pop reg2
code += b"\xDD" + p32(0x00) # push 0x00
code += b"\xDE\x03" # pop reg3
code += b"\x80" #syscall
code += b"/bin/sh\0"

r.sendlineafter(b"Input command: ", b64encode(code))
r.sendline(b"cat ./flag.txt")

r.interactive()

##### Midas
###### Pwner/Memer

CTF player. Reverser. Pwner. Memer.